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the right to appeal something more substantial than the theoretical right
hitherto enjoyed by the majority of defendants.57 Prominent among these
reforms is provision for a stenographic in lieu of a printed record.5 Further
example is found in the provision in the new Arizona code to the effect that
the defendant may file an affidavit showing his inability to pay for a copy
of the record; if he satisfies the court as to the truth of his allegations, the
county will assume the necessary expense.5
9
The conclusion is inescapable that the movement for reform in criminal
procedure is exceedingly mild in its aims. Its so-called reforms are generally
liberal so far as they go. But they plainly do not represent any fundamental
revaluation or clarification of the objectives of a criminal procedure, in tune
with the very changed conditions of modern times. Hence the committee
which will be called upon by the Supreme Court to devise a new code for
the federal courts will not have, as was the case with civil procedure, a far-
seeing and well evolved body of modem principles and rules of practice for
its guidance. It will have, however, a splendid opportunity to launch a new
and basic program of reform based on its own research, experience, and
ingenuity.
PROTECTION OF POLICYHOLDERS UNDER
REINSURANCE AGREEMENTS
A LIFE insurance company wishing to discontinue business has two avail-
able alternatives: it may cancel all policies and distribute assets, with the
obvious economic loss entailed in forced liquidation; or it may follow the
more customary practice of executing an assumption agreement, commonly
termed "reinsurance," whereby a second insurer assumes the policies and
receives the assets of the resigning company.' The assumption agreement is
24 CA.wF. L. Rav. 623, 633 et seq.; ORmL, op. cit. supra note 50, at 12 et seq.; widening
the scope of appeal, see Shapiro, Criminal Appeal on the Facts and the Federal Judicial
System (1939) 34 I.. L. REv. 332; empowering the appellate court to modify sentences
without ordering a new trial, see A. L. I. Code § 459; WicKERasu. Coinsissio.:;, Raroar
ON LAwLE S ESs IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (1931) 345; Hall, Reduclion of Criminal
Sentences on Appeal (1937) 37 Co. L. Rnv. 521, 762; (1937) 36 Micu. L Ray. 105.
57. See OurED, op. cit. supra note 50, c. X (appeal in forma pauperis) ; Millar,
supra note 36, at 366; and note 5 mpra.
58. A. L. I. Code §§ 445-446.
59. Arizona Code § 436.
1. As a label for the assumption agreement, "reinsurance" is a misnomer. In the
proper sense of the term, it is the means of distributing the risk of loss further than
among the policyholders of one company. This is accomplished by an insurer insuring
in another company a portion of its liability on an individual risk. As a result, although
the first insurer will be required to pay the entire loss to the insured, it will be indemni-
fied in part by the reinsurer. An assumption-reinsurance, on the other hand, substitutes
one insurer for another. HuEBNER, PaOERTY INsURANcE (3d ed. 1938) ch. 14.
19401
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
used in two situations. In the first, the insurer, a going concern, voluntarily
decides to discontinue all business, to withdraw from a particular area, or
to close out a particular line.2 In the second and more frequent situation in
recent years, a transfer of all risks is compelled by imminent insolvency or
as part of a receivership proceeding.3 In any of these instances, it is important
that policyholders, whose contracts are shifted and sometimes altered, be
protected from any disadvantageous transfers.
The chief dangers to policyholders in the first class of assumption agree-
ment are the possibilities that the policies will be shifted to an unsound insurer,
and that the transaction will be used to provide occasion for an unnecessary
reduction in the insured's advantages. The orthodox means of policyholder
protection against these evils flow from his right that liabilities to him under
the contract shall not be shifted without his consent. Occasionally, however,
insurers, in their rush for speedy dissolution by means of a simultaneous
transfer of all policyholders, have sought to eliminate even that protection.
It has been argued that a provision in a corporate charter giving the insurer
power to amalgamate and transfer becomes a part of the insured's contract,
and must be interpreted as agreement in advance by the policyholder that
the insurer may at any time substitute a different obligor.4 Inasmuch as no
policyholder is likely to be familiar with the corporate charter, it is extremely
unrealistic to imply advance consent and thus confront him with a new and
possibly less responsible insurer. Further attempt has been made to eliminate
consent by arguing that governmental regulation per se makes the insured's
acceptance unnecessary.5 It is claimed that if a company follows statutory
procedure and obtains approval of a court or of an insurance commissioner
it should be allowed to free itself of the burden of obtaining consent. But
the fact of regulation alone hardly seems to justify an inference of legislative
intention to force a new contract on an insured. At the very least, a forth-
right legislative pronouncement would be expected.0 Neither of these attempts
to obviate the need for consent appears, however, to have succeeded in this
country.7 Although some American courts8 have mentioned the possibility
2. Blehl, Bulk Reinsurance (1921) 22 TRANS. OF AcrUARIAL. Soc. or AM. 113.
The fact that no "reinsurance" agreement is actually drawn up, as in some mergers, is
of no legal importance.
3. HoBs, WORcMEN'S COMPENSATION INsURANCE (2d ed. 1939) 434.
4. Cocker's Case, 3 Ch. D. 1 (1876) ; see Eve, J., in In re United British Ins. Co.,
[1929] 2 Ch. D. 430, 434; cf. Mellish, L. J., in Conquest's Case, 1 Ch. D. 334, 344 (1875) "
It re India & London Life Assur. Co., 7 Ch. 651 (1872) (charter clause "dissolution
without prejudice to the rights of the parties then assured" held not to permit involun-
tary transfer).
5. Lord President, in In re Empire Guar. & Ins. Corp., [1911] Sess. Cas, 1296;
cf. It re United British Ins. Co., [1929] 2 Ch. D. 430.
6. Some foreign countries specifically grant an insurer the power to shift his liabil-
ity. Hunter, Reinsurance and Transfer of Business in Foreign Countries (1924) 25
TRANS. OF ACTUARIAL SOC. OF Am. 5.
7. Probably the universal American rule that the application and the policy consti-
tute the entire contract would defeat any attempt to refer to the charter. 1 CoucH, Cyc.o-
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of substituting regulation for policyholder assent, actual acceptance of that
argument 9 and of the theory of advance consent through the corporate
charter10 has been confined to England.
In the absence of any blanket consent, each individual policyholder must
be induced to agree to a novation of his contract in order to make an effectual
transfer. But even this may be a hollow gesture. The normal procedure- is
for the assuming company to send the policyholder a vague notice, in the
shape of a rider to be attached to his policy, informing him that his insurer
has amalgamated'with another insurance company and that his policy will
be kept in force as before "subject to the terms of the reinsurance agree-
ment,"' and further, that he should "address all [future] communications
to the new company."' 1 2 Under these circumstances the insured never sees
the contents of the reinsurance contract. 13 Even were he to obtain the terms
of the agreement, he would be powerless to vary them, for the policyholder's
only alternatives are adhesion to the offered terms or outright rejection1 4
Furthermore, the only evidence of the reinsurer's stability comes from assur-
ances by the reinsurer's agents that no important events have taken place.1 5
The insured is therefore likely to assume that his company has branched
out, that the new company is an agent of the old, and that his policy is un-
altered. And if the insured does not actively dissent, but rather delivers
his premiums to and accepts benefits from the reinsurer, courts tend to imply
a novation by the insured.10 The burden of taking affirmative action to deny
the novation is put upon the policyholders, notwithstanding the ease with
which the reinsurer could circularize them and explain the available alterna-
tives.17 Once a novation is found, of course, the insured is bound by all
PEDIA OF IN SURANCE (1929) § 138. But the argument might hold with benefit societies
where the contract is not limited to these documents. Comment (1938) 47 Y,%LE L. J.
965, 966.
8. See Green v. American Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 112 S. NV. (2d) 924 (Mo. 1933).
9. In re Empire Guar. & Ins. Corp., [1911] Sess. Cas. 1296.
10. Cocker's Case, 3 Ch. D. 1 (1876).
11. This phrase serves to incorporate the entire reinsurance agreement into the pol-
icyholder's contract. Spande v. Western Life Indem. Co., 61 Ore. 236, 122 Pac. 33 (1912).
12. See, e.g., Amarillo Mut. Benev. Ass'n v. Franklin, 50 S. AV. (2d) 264 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1932).
13. See Kentucky Home Life Ins. Co. v. Leisman, 26S Ky. 825, 105 S. NV. (2d) 1046
(1937).
14. See Green v. American Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 112 S. NV. (2d) 924 (Mo. 1938);
cf. Watson v. National Life & Trust Co., 189 Fed. 872 (C. C. A. 8th, 1911).
15. See Green v. American Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 93 S. W. (2d) 1119 (Mo. App.
1936).
16. Watson v. National Life & Trust Co., 139 Fed. 872 (C. C. A. 8th, 1911) ; In re
Anchor Assur. Co., 5 Ch. 632 (1870) ; cf. In re Family Endowment Soc., 5 Ch. 118 (1869).
But see In re India & London Life Assur. Co., 7 Ch. 651 (1872).
17. Veil v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 264 Ill. 425, 106 N. E. 246 (1914); In re Times
Life Assur. & Guar. Co., L. R. 5 Ch. 381 (1870); ef. Griffith's Case, 40 L J. Ch. 464
(1871).
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the terms of the assumption agreement, whether advantageous18 or disad-
vantageous to him,19 and can ordinarily look only to the reinsurer for
recovery. 20
Even when a novation is lacking, either because none will be implied or
the insured has expressly refused to assent, the value of the policyholder's
exercise of his freedom of choice may be illusory. The resigning company
may be a shell retaining no assets, and leaving no remedy but a suit over
against the reinsurer, as recipient of all assets, for cancellation damages.2"
And since damages will not generally take into consideration the fact that
the insured has become a greater risk,22 he will not be able to obtain so much
18. Reinsurance does not enlarge the policyholder's rights under the original policy,
or renew rights already lost. For example, the reinsurer is entitled to the same defenses
as was the insurer. See Eminent Household of Columbian Woodmen v. Bryant, 59 Ga.
App. 238, 200 S. E. 321 (1939).
19. Home Life Ins. Co. v. Arnold, 196 Ark. 1046, 120 S. W. (2d) 1012 (1938).
20. Mutual Relief Ass'n v. Poindexter, 178 Ark. 205, 10 S. W. (2d) 17 (1928). But
see Fidelity & Dep. Co. of Md. v. Frazier, 190 Ark. 833, 81 S. W. (2d) 915 (1935).
Where the contract is not considered a novation, however, the policyholder's remedy
against the original insurer remains. Columbia Cas. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 56
P. (2d) 527 (Cal. 1936). Three forms of assumption contract have been used: (1) nova-
tion: see Cunningham v. Great S. Life Ins. Co., 66 S. W. (2d) 765 (Tex. Civ. App.
1933), rev'd, 128 Tex. 196, 97 S. W. (2d) 692 (1936); (2) third party beneficiary:
Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Means, 264 Ky. 566, 95 S. W. (2d) 264 (1936); and (3) a
separate contract between reinsurer and insured: Indiana Mut. Cas. Co. v. Pratt, 177
Minn. 36, 224 N. W. 253 (1929). Cf. VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1920) § 285. The
courts seldom distinguish clearly among the three. Thus the contract is often found at
once (1) to leave unchanged the original insurer's liability, (2) to require an acceptance
by the policyholder, and (3) to include the original insurer as a party. See United States
Fire Ins. Co. v. Hecht, 231 Ala. 256, 164 So. 65 (1935); cf. Maddy v. National Life Ins,
Co., 156 Minn. 375, 194 N. W. 880 (1923). But each finding is inconsistent with the
theory of contract bearing the same number above. The difficulties may, however, be
rationalized by considering the "acceptance" as not the acceptance of contract terminology,
but merely the condition precedent to the reinsurer's duty to perform. This rationale is
supported by the fact that courts find the "acceptance" in almost any manifestation. Thus
institution of suit against the reinsurer fulfills the acceptance requirement. Delp v. Mis-
souri State Life Ins. Co., 116 W. Va. 508, 182 S. E. 580 (1935).
In the case of third party beneficiary contracts, the policyholder has had to surmount
the claim of the reinsurer that the insured is not in privity of contract with and there-
fore may not sue the reinsurer. But today the courts, realizing vaguely that a transfer
is "more than a mere contract of reinsurance," almost invariably allow such a suit. Mor-
ris & Co. v. Skandinavia Ins. Co., 279 U. S. 405 (1929). For a summary of the cases,
see Note (1936) 103 A. L. R. 1485. This is so even where the companies in their con-
tract explicitly deny the insured's right to sue the transferee, Shoaf v. Palatine Ins. Co.,
127 N. C. 308, 37 S. E. 451 (1900); RICHARDS, LAW OF INSURANCE (4th ed. 1932)
§ 486; where the insured has no notice of the agreement, Stewart v. Inter-Ocean Reins.
Corp., 260 Ky. 787, 86 S. W. (2d) 703 (1935) ; or where the insurer has cancelled the
agreement with the reinsurer, Sawyer v. Sunset Mut. Life Ins. Co., 8 Cal. (2d) 492, 59
P. (2d) 208 (1937).
21. See Kuhl v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 56 Ga. App. 424, 192 S. E. 831 (1937).
22. See note 90 infra.
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coverage as he previously held, should he apply the damages toward new
insurance.
It is apparent that a policyholder can seldom protect himself effectively
through his ordinary contract rights against any uneconomic alteration in
his policy. He must, therefore, seek the assistance of some branch of the
government. The courts, which operate retrospectively, can do little more
than enforce the new contractm or void the entire agreement when assets
have been juggled 2 4 for the purpose of reducing policyholder benefits in spite
of a sufficiency of assets to cover liabilities.2 5 To remedy the situation, a
court may set aside the transfer of assets as a fraudulent conveyance,20 or
hold the reinsurer to the letter of the original policy..2 7 The latter is accom-
plished by applying the rule that the recipient of all assets of a discontinuing
corporation is liable for all obligations of the latter.2 8 The same result is
reached by a decision that the insured reasonably thought he was accepting
a novation of his contract unchanged and that this is binding on the rein-
surer.29 But judicial protection is not fully satisfactory, 0 for the court
23: National Aid Life Ass'n v. Bailey, 54 S. WV. (2d) 1035 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
24. North Carolina fut. Life Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 186 Miss. 368, 188 So. 554 (1939).
See HoBBS, WORKMEN'S CoMmrsArrO INSURANCE (2d ed. 1939) 449.
25. Booker T. Washington Burial Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 228 Ala. 206, 153 So. 469
(1934).
26. See Taggart v. Keim, 103 F. (2d) 194 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
27. When the reinsurer expressly agrees to assume all existing liabilities he is, of
course, bound by the old liabilities. Washington Nat. Ins. Co. v. Scott, 231 Ala. 131,
164 So. 303 (1935).
28. Runbeck Farmers' & Bankers' Life Ins. Co., 96 Kan. 186, 150 Pac. 5S6 (1915);
15 FL=CHER, CORPORATiONS (Perm. ed. 1932) § 7115. But see United States v. Inter-
national Reins. Corp., 183 Ga. 614, 189 S. E. 237 (1936). Liability is limited to the
assets received. Julian v. American Nat. Bank, 21 Tenn. App. 137, 106 S. W. (2d)
871 (1937). Where, on this ground, the reinsurer has been held for the unchanged liability,
it would seem that any agreement by the insured to accept a reduction would not be bind-
ing, for the reinsurer's performance of his pre-existing legal cuty is insufficient consid-
eration. ANSoN, CoxrRAcrs (Corbin's ed. 1930) § 138. See Sutton v. North Am. Ace.
Ins. Co., 208 S. V. 499 (Mo. App. 1919); cf. York v. Central Ill. Mut. Relief Ass'n,
340 Ill. 595, 173 N. E. 80 (1932). Support is lent this argument by cases which impliedly
rule that, to hold the reinsurer, the insured does not have to accept the reduced liability
affirmed. Wallace v. Commercial Life Ins. Co., 271 Ill. App. 291 (1933).
29. American Ins. Union v. Robinson, 170 Ark. 767, 281 S. W. 393 (1926); cf.
Knight v. American Ins. Union, 172 Ark. 303, 288 S. WN. 395 (1926). Under such cir-
cumstances the policyholder's contract is found elsewhere than in the reinsurance agree-
ment between the insurers. McIntyre v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 142 Mo. App. 256, 126
S. V. 227 (1910) (oral statements of agent) ; Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Pastore, 63 S. W.
(2d) 1039 (Tex. 1933) (proposition sent by error). But cf. Spande v. Western Life
Indem. Co., 61 Ore. 220, 122 Pac. 38 (1912) (detailed letter ending "Come with us,
live with us, die with us, you will never regret either," held mere negotiation for nova-
tion).
30. A further remedy for the policyholder whose benefits have been decreased by the
reinsurer under the transfer agreement is a suit for wrongful cancellation. America Ins.
1940]
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cannot guarantee a sound reinsurer,31 or vary individual terms of the
contract.
32
In view of the inability of courts to cope with specific inequities in the
agreement, legislatures have attempted to deal with the problems. But
statutory regulations have been confined to rather general requirements that
policyholders be given a chance to present their views as to the terms of
the agreement.33 A common requisite, that no agreement shall be consum-
mated without notice to policyholders and a hearing,84 indicates a belief that
policyholders can and will vary the terms of the contract. But such is not
the case, for the individual' policyholder's bargaining power is infinitesimal
and policyholders' protective committees are notoriously weak33 and difficult
of formation. It may be for this reason that several states have limited the
notice and hearing requirement to "if demanded." 30 In fact even where notice
and hearing are compulsory, commissioners have often refused to enforce
them.3 7 A vote by policyholders before consummation of a transfer, another
device designed to strengthen the policyholder's right to protect himself, has
met similar treatment.38 Since speed is essential to the success of a reinsurance
agreement,3 9 most states have eliminated as a prerequisite to a transfer the
vote of policyholders in both mutual 40 and stock companies 41 as well as of
stockholders in the latter.42
Union v. Mead, 135 Okla. 93, 274 P. 475 (1929). But this remedy is unsatisfactory.
See text accompanying note 22 supra.
31. Many policies have been reinsured a number of times, each insurer being un-
sound, although each reinsurance has been subjected to court scrutiny in litigation. Sce
e.g., Hahn v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 132 Neb. 509, 272 N. W. 321 (1937).
32. See, e.g., Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Green, 109 S. W. 1131 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1908), where policyholder failed to collect cash surrender value from reinsurer be-
cause reinsurance contract limited liability to death claims. But see Kuhl v. Gcneral Am.
Life Ins. Co., 56 Ga. App. 424, 192 S. E. 831 (1937) (suggests reformation in equity).
33. The statutes vary fromone form of life insurance company to another. The
form most consistently rogulated is the fraternal benefit society. See Cavlovic v. Baker,
118 Kan. 412, 234 Pac. 1009 (1925).
34. See, e.g., N. D. ComP. LAws ANN. (1925) § 4890.
35. Policyholder apathy is demonstrated in Watson v. National Life & Trust Co.,
189 Fed. 872 (C. C. A. 8th, 1911). There, despite an effort to stir up litigation because
evidence of speculation existed, only twenty policyholders out of 30,061 dissented.
36. See, e.g., ILL. STAT. ANN. (Jones, 1939) § 66.850.
37. See Sachs v. Roseland State Savings Bank, 32 F. Supp. 152 (N. D. Ill. 1940).
38. Ibid.
39. Delay will give an opportunity to agents of the old insurer, who are seldom
taken along to the transferee, to attempt to convince the policyholders to cash in and
take out insurance in any company with whom the agent is then associated.
40. Most of the states which require a vote insist on a two-thirds vote. See, e.g.,
IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) § 40-1723. A few require a majority vote: e.g., MINN. STAT.
(Mason, 1927) § 3436.
41. Among the few states requiring a vote of policyholders in stock companies is
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) § 6462.
42. Votes of stockholders are required generally by the same states which require
votes of mutual policyholders. See, e.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Connick, 1935) c. 40,
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The only other general statutory provisions in addition to the procedural
safeguards do little more than confirm accepted practices.3 Thus Kentucky
has put in statute form the necessary rule that the age limit on writing cannot
apply to reinsurance, as policies are transferred regardless of the insured's
age at assumption ;44 California has legislated that the recipient of all the
insurers' assets assumes all the liabilities.40  Finally, the legislatures' only
noteworthy effort directly to eradicate the prevalent evil of using the transfer
as a speculative device 40 to provide promoters with huge commissions, is
apparently not too successful. The TNEC hearings on insurance showed
that these statutes did not prevent indirect promotional profits obtained as
brokerage fees and by stock manipulation. 47
Since statutory regulations do not seem to have stamped out profiteering
and can hardly determine the best contract in the particular case, or choose
the most responsible reinsurer, reliance must be placed on the state insurance
commissioner. Except in the few instances where the commissioner's approval
is to be granted automatically upon proof that the statutory procedure has
been followed, 48 the insurance commissioner has plenary power to approve,
disapprove,49 and even to order50 a reinsurance. In exercising his power
§309; cf. NEB. Comp. STAT. (1929) §44-414(3) (specifically requires vote of board of
directors).
43. A few remedial statutes do exist. Utah tries to deal with the uninformed policy-
holder by stipulating that "in case the transfer is to result in increased premium or de-
creased insurance, notice shall so state." UTAH REv. STT. AN:,. (1933) § 43-4-17. In
an attempt to guarantee a solvent reinsurer, Wyoming sets up a minimum capital stock
and surplus which the reinsurer must have. Wyo. REv. ST.T. AN.. (Courtright, 1931)
§ 57-208. In order to avoid claims of reinsurers that they are not liable directly to the
insured, two states specifically impose that liability, and insist that the reinsurer endorse
the policy, apparently with the idea of thereby creating privity of contract. IDAno Coaz
Awx. (1932) § 40-802; V.sm REv. STAT. AN~N. (Remington, 1932) § 7126.
44. Ky. STAT. ANt. (Baldwin, 1936) § 678. The same rule vas laid down in Cath-
cart v. Equitable Mut. Life Ass'n of Waterloo, 111 Iowa 471, 82 N. V. 964 (1900). A
similar problem arises when a company subject to a statute limiting the amount which
it may insure on one risk assumes the risks of an insurer not so subject. The statute
is not applied to reinsurance. American Ins. Co. of Texas v. Jenkins, 133 S. W. (2d)
847 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
45. CAL. INS. CODE (Deering, Supp. 1939) § 10952.1.
46. Dumont, Buying, Selling, and Mcrging of Insurance Companlics (1926) 57
PRoc. NAT'L Com. INs. CoMM'Rs 283.
47. See 9 TNEC VERBa's1m RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS (1939) 573-594, 613-630; ci.
Wright v. Federal Reserve Life Ins. Co., 131 Kan. 601, 293 Pac. 945 (1930). For a
typical "no promotional fee" statute, see ALA. CODE A-NN. ('Michie, 1928) § 8474.
48. CAL_ INs. CODE (Deering, 1937) § 10841 (mutual); cf. id. § 10952 (stock).
49. Approval by the insurance commissioner is the one requirement found in almost
every state. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. (1930) c. 60, § 136. An agreement not approved
by the commissioner is void. Ballou v. Davis, 75 F4. (2d) 138 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935), cert.
denied, 295 U. S. 766; Clair v. American Bankers Ins. Co., 137 S. W. (2d) 969. (Mo.
App. 1940). An almost equally universal requirement is the one that only an authorized
company may be chosen as a reinsurer. See, e.g., Ana. DiG. STAT. (Pope, 1937) § 762.
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he can force inclusion of protective provisions. The effectiveness of com-
missioner supervision on that score is demonstrated by the treatment accorded
the practice of inducing policyholders to accept policies rewritten by the
reinsurer on less favorable terms than the old policies for which they are
substituted. 5' Eradication of this profiteering has been accomplished by com-
missioner insistence on insertion of a "no rewriting" clause in the agree-
ments.5 2 To make doubly certain that companies will subject themselves to
the commissioner, statutes strengthen the grant of power with the declara-
tion that disobedience entitles the commissioner to take over and run or
liquidate the recalcitrant insurer.53
Although legislatures have been liberal in their grants of power to a coin-
missioner, they attempt to put checks on his discretion by requiring the
further approval of two other major state officials, 5 4 or, where one of the
insurers is not domestic, of other insurance commissioners.", But these limi-
tations are not overly important, for, in practice, the commissioner's decision
controls that of his colleagues within the state."0 And the check provided
by other commissioners is hardly a limitation; while it may serve to cut down
on a commissioner's discretion in a particular case, it enhances the power of
commissioners in general, for each ruling covers a larger area.57
50. Usually the commissioner must first find that the insurer's capital is impaired
before he demands a reinsurance. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michle and Lublett,
1937) § 3314.
51. Watts, Life Insurance Reorganidation (1935) 29 ILL. L. REV. 559, 578. Although
the new policy appears identical to the old, there may be a danger to the insured in the
clauses which put the policyholder under a disability for a period of time beginning with
the writing of the policy. The time may be doubled by starting it running again from
the time of rewriting. Williamson v. American Ins. Union, 284 Ill. App. 150, 1 N. E.
(2d) 541 (1936) (no recovery for suicide clause). A recurring problem has resulted
when a legal reserve company reinsured an assessment company. A great number of
assessment policyholders usually switch to the level premium plan. Therefore few remain
subject to assessment, and an assessment of those brings in much less than the policy's face
value. American Ins. Union v. Wylie, 23 S. W. (2d) 491 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929). But
see Smith v. Northwestern Nat. Life Ins. Co., 123 Wis. 586, 102 N. W. 57 (1905).
52. Morthland v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 25 N. E. (2d) 325 (Ind. 1940) ; Watts,
loc. cit. supra note 51.
53. The statute usually declares that bulk reinsurance without the approval of the
commissioner is an indication of insolvency giving the commissioner the right to apply
to a court for an order requiring that the company show cause why it should not be
liquidated, rehabilitated or reinsured; or why, if a foreign company, its assets should
not be conserved. See, e.g., WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) § 7042(1).
54. The other officials are usually the Attorney General and the Governor or his
appointee. See, e.g., IowA CODE (1935) § 9108.
55. See, e.g., S. C. CODE (1932) § 8051. Connecticut calls in other commissioners for
domestic as well as foreign companies. CONN. GEN. STAT. (1932) § 8051.
56. In Sachs v. Roseland State Savings Bank, 32 F. Supp. 152 (N. D. Ill. 1940) the
commissioner testified that he never bothered to call in the other officials.
57. Cf. Helm v. Ben Hur Life Ass'n, 107 S. W. (2d) 844 (Mo. App. 1937). For a
comprehensive summary of the commissioner's broad power over reinsurance see PAT-
TERSON, INSURANCE COMMISSIONER IN THE UNITED STATES (1927) § 16(6).
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In addition to the dangers that policyholders may be shifted to an unsound
insurer and that the transfer may be a profiteering scheme, special needs
for policyholder protection arise when the transfer is compelled by insolvency.
The problem here is one of assuring the policyholder as creditor that, as in
other kinds of debtor rearrangement, any plan of administration will be "fair,
equitable and feasible."5 8 If a reinsurance is used, the transfer is possible
only if some reduction is made in the liabilities of the resigning company
in order to offset the insufficiency of assets transferred. It might be possible,
of course, partially to avoid this loss by providing in advance for a preference
to transferred policyholders through segregation of those assets which offset
the balance sheet liability measure of the assets to be transferred-i.e., the
legal reserve.59 This would, in effect, immunize a portion of assets so that
neither loss claimants nor ordinary creditors could share in them. Obviously,
if such segregated assets retained a value approaching the necessary reserve
which they offset, there would be little need to reduce policyholder liability.
Such a device is not favored, however, by either courts, legislatures, or
commissioners. 60 The legal reserve is at present no more than an accounting
device; assets are not segregated, and there is consequently no orthodox legal
method by which to substantiate a preference. Nevertheless, there is an
indication that this type of preference might not be considered equitable.
In mutual insurance cases, for example, loss claimants are always preferred
over the unmatured claimants.6 1 Legislatures also reflect a similar attitude
for, of the four states that set up priorities, only an unenforced Wisconsin
statute favors the unmatured.6 2
A stronger manifestation of disapproval of preferences for transferred
policyholders is demonstrated by the treatment accorded the segregated fund
in the form of a deposit of securities required by the several states as a
prerequisite to doing business. This fund is earmarked for the benefit of
58. See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prod. Co., 308 U. S. 106 (1939), (1940) 49
YALE L. J. 1099; Dodd, The Los Angeles Lumber Products Conpany Case and its Im-
plications (1940) 53 HAtv. L. REv. 713.
59. This plan has been suggested by the traditional theory that in fire insurance the
"reinsurance reserve is a trust fund for the policyholders." Leavens, Orthodoxy of Un-
earned Premium Reserves, 11 J. OF Am. INs., June, 1934, p. 23. Since the fire com-
pany's unearned premium reserve, which is the basis of the "reinsurance reserve," has
many of the characteristics of the life company's legal reserve, it might be possible to
label the legal reserve a "reinsurance reserve" and thereby carry the trust fund theory
over to life insurance. See Hutarnm, LiFE IzstaN.CNc (1925) 205. But see (1935) 35
CoL. L. REv. 615.
60. Rosenberg, Are Unearned Premiums Trust Funds? 11 .J. oF Amx. I-s., Jan.,
1934, p. 11. In Central-Penn. Nat. Bank v. New Jersey Fid. & Plate Glass Ins. Co.,
117 N. 3. Eq. 548, 177 Atl. 441 (1935) the device was specifically tried and rejected by
the court.
61. This results from the theory that upon a loss, a policyholder is no longer a
member, and members must defer to non-members. Rosenberg, supra note 60, at 14.
62. MfAss. GEN. LAws (1932) c. 175, § 46; Mo. STAT. ANN. (1940 Supp.) § 5951;
OHIo CoDE ANN. (Throcknmorton, 1938) § 6348; Wis. STAT. (1939) § 203.05.
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policy-holders living within the state requiring the deposit.03 Despite the
fact that the usual reinsurance agreement provides for the transfer to the
reinsuring company 64 of title to the deposits, the provision is sometimes
defeated. Courts in receivership cases, 3 and commissioners"' in other in-
stances usually insist that the deposit be held for the benefit of those resident
policyholders who are not transferred to the reinsurer. Furthermore, where
an insurance commissioner controls the terms of a reinsurance agreement,
he usually requires a stipulation to the effect that all assenting policyholders
renounce claims to deposits. 7 Thus all preferences to the funds are killed,
the deposits becoming available equally to all creditors.
In the absence of any method of advance protection of policyholders in
an insolvent company, reliance must be placed on the safeguards surrounding
the transferring process. Of paramount importance in this regard are the
devices used for scaling down liabilities. The usual method is to place a
lien on the policyholder's net reserve, or equity, to cover insufficiency of
transferred assets. 68 The lien functions as a policy loan, cutting down pro
tanto the insured's recovery, except where a loss occurs shortly after assump-
tion of the policy, and eliminating the right to extended insurance which is
63. Typical of the deposit statutes is DaL. REV. CODE (1935) § 475.
64. See, e.g., reinsurance agreement between Peoria Life and Alliance Life, Oct. 4,
1934, § 28, quoted in Abstract of Record, p. 41, Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v. Alliance Life
Ins. Co., 25 N. E. (2d) 831 (Ill. App. 1940).
65. Lucas v. Pittsburgh Life & Trust Co., 137 Va. 255, 119 S. E. 109 (1923). See
Lovell v. St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co., 111 U. S. 264 (1884); cf. Hobbs v. Occidental
Life Ins. Co., 87 F. (2d) 380 (C. C. A. 10th, 1937) (commissioner's refusal to turn over
securities overruled).
66. PArrERsoN, INSURANCE CO'MMISSIONER IN THE UNITED STATES (1927) § 17(5).
But once the commissioner transfers the deposited assets to the reinsurer, they are no
longer impressed with a trust for the insurer's policyholders. Julian v. American Bank,
21 Tenn. App. 171, 106 S. W. (2d) 871 (1937) ; cf. Lucas v. Pittsburgh Life & Trust Co.,
137 Va. 255, 119 S. E. 109 (1923) (transfer declared to be a conclusive presumption that
all policyholders had been assumed). Statutes often hamper the transfer. ORE. CODE ANN.
(Supp. 1935) § 46-139 (deposit restored if reinsurer puts up deposit and agrees to assume
all liabilities); MICii. Co-Nip. LAws (1929) § 12310 (securities turned over on order of
commissioner); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Connick, 1935) § 40-309 (consent of policy-
holder necessary for release).
67. See, e.g., Peoria reinsurance agreement, supra note 64, § 48. This effort to dis-
regard deposit preferences in reinsurances is in line with the Uniform Reciprocal Liquida-
tion Act's similar attempt in liquidation. See (1937) 37 CoL. L. REV. 1031, 1035.
68. An obvious alternative to the lien as a means of scaling down liabilities is the
immediate reduction in the face of the policy. But if the reduction is a permanent one
it has the drawback of being a guess based on the probable future value of the assets
taken over. And the alternative of making periodic adjustments in the face as asset
value changes is disfavored because of administrative difficulties. Watts, supra note 51,
at 576. A Wisconsin statute suggests this method. Wis. STAT. (1937) § 201.27. Cf.




ordinarily available to a policyholder who permits his insurance to lapse.Co
As the assets increase in value, and profits increase, the lien is reduced."
The reinsurance agreement will also probably provide for a few years'
moratorium on the cash surrender value, which means that the insured can-
not turn in his policy should he decide that immediate cash is more valuable
than continued insurance. These several requirements naturally prejudice
policyholders, particularly because no insured is ordinarily aware of their
existence.71
Some attempt has been made to avoid by statute the incidence of a transfer
in insolvency. 72 Indiana, for example, provides that the reinsurance contract
must not impair the insured's rights.73 This would literally mean that no
lien could be placed on the policy and that no other change be made under
a reinsurance agreement. But this is obviously impracticable, because no
reinsurer would assume liabilities unmatched by equivalent assets. Litigation
in Indiana demonstrates the unworkability of the statute.74 In the first place,
it has been held that if the pplicyholder agrees to an alteratiun, the statute
69. Some attempts by insurers on the borderline of insolvency to solicit voluntary
liens have been upheld by the courts. People ex rel. American Bankers Ins. Co. v.
Palmer, 363 Ill. 499, 2 N. E. (2d) 728 (1936). But Illinois's new cude prohibits the
voluntary lien. Moser, Illinois Insurance Code (1938) 4 Jori MAr sUAt. L Q. 146.
Compare the failure of a reinsurer's attempt to justify a lien by calling it an assessment.
Eminent Household of Columbian VWoodmen v. Bryant, 59 Ga. App. 233, 200 S. E. 321
(Ga. App. 1938).
70. The assets of the old company and the entire reinsured business are segregated
for a period of some fifteen years. The lien remaining at the end of that time is usually
made permanent. See, e.g., Peoria reinsurance agreement, sitra note 64, § 31.
71. That the lien holds great potential harm for the unknowing policyholder is dem-
onstrated by the volume of cases centering around policyholders who have been lulled
into a false sense of security by the apparent continuance of their policy in its old form.
For a particularly unfortunate case, see Spears v. Independent Order of Foresters, 107
S. IV. (2d) 126 (Mo. App. 1937). The courts have not, however, always sympathized
with the policyholder, arguing that "cheap insurance is generally e.xpensive insurance
in the long run." [See Lewis v. Columbia Mutual Life Ins. Co., 197 So. 619, 638 (La. App.
1940)], and that but for the reinsurance, the policyholder would have nothing. Roper v.
Columbian Circle, 113 Kan. 280, 214 P. 421 (1923).
72. Few states go beyond a mention of the possible terms of the reinsurance con-
tract. See, e.g., ORIo CODE ANN. (Throckmorton, 1938) § 634-3a (lien); CAT. INs.
CODE: (Deering, 1937) § 1044 (moratorium on cash surrender). A handful of states
attempt some detailed regulation. See CAL. INs. Coo (Deering, Supp. 1939) § 10952.1;
cf. ILT. STAT. ANN. (Jones, 1939) §§ 66.851, 66,86, interpreted in Parvin v. Mutual
Reserve Life Ins. Co., 125 Iowa 95, 100 N. W. 39 (1904). But the proof that detailed
statutory regulation is unsuccessful is evidenced in the recent change in Missouri's stat-
ute from the most detailed regulation to a simple grant of discretion to the commis-
sioner. Compare Mo. STAT. ANN. (1932) c. 37, § 5953 with Mo. ST.T. AN:N. (Supp.
1940) c. 37, § 5953. See Delp v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 116 .N Va. 50S, 182
S. E. 580 (1935).
73. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) § 39-1808.
74. See cases cited in Note (1923) 25 A. L. R. 1535, 1536, and notes 75 and 76 in!ra.
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does not apply.75 And, further, the provision has been whittled down to
cover only assessment companies not in receivership. 70 An equally unsatis-
factory statutory provision is one requiring that a policyholder who refuses
to be transferred under the agreement should be allowed to choose any other
company to which he wishes to be transferred. 7 This implies that a separate
reinsurance contract is to be made for each dissenter. But such an arrange-
ment would probably result in prohibitive administrative expenses. Further-
more, it is doubtful that a company would be interested in the assumption
of only one, or at most a few, policies.
It might be possible under ordinary circumstances, of course, for an in-
sured to rely upon his privilege to refuse novation of his contract. And if
full information were given him concerning the alterations which would
be made under the agreement, there would be little reason to fear that the
special qualifications placed on policies would prejudice the holder. The
insured would doubtless be left without insurance, but presumably would
prefer this to the disadvantages of reinsurance. But the difficulty with util-
izing this protective device is that exercise of the privilege to refuse to be
reinsured jeopardizes the entire reinsurance plan. A large number of refusals
would require wholesale liquidation of assets to pay off dissenters, thus defeat-
ing the very purpose of a reinsurance agreement.78 In fact, a sufficiently
large number of dissents may require abandonment of any transfer because
insufficient assets are left unliquidated to make it worthwhile for a reinsurer
to attempt to salvage the reserve required to carry the policies assumed.
Even if the entire transaction is not defeated, problems are raised whose
solution is reached only at the expense of some group. When there is only
a partial transfer for reinsurance purposes, payment of dissenters raises the
question of an equitable distribution of the assets between them and the
transferred policyholders. To pay dissenters, cash must be raised either by
selling assets or by borrowing from continuing creditors. 79 The latter is
difficult as policyholders can hardly be expected to contribute; and since
insolvencies generally occur during periods of depression, the reinsurer may
neither wish to nor be able to advance cash. If it does advance cash, it
probably will insist on severing some assets for its exclusive use. Some
assets will probably have to be sold or severed, therefore, and either the dis-
senting or continuing policyholders will suffer, for one group must accept some
illiquid assets. Should the dissenters receive them, sale will bring in far
less than their sound value; should they be segregated for the assenters, con-
75. Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Frazer, 192 Ind. 565, 137 N. E. 273 (1922) (by impli-
cation); cf. Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Barnett, 71 Ind. App. 613, 125 N. E. 522 (1919).
See Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Maxam, 70 Ind. App. 266, 117 N. E. 801 (1917).
76. Western Life Indem. Co. v. Bartlett, 84 Ind. App. 589, 145 N. E. 786 (1924);
cf. Garretson v. Western Life Indem. Co., 175 Iowa 172, 157 N. W. 160 (1916).
77. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. (Michie & Lublett, 1936) § 4266.
78. Watts, supra note 51, at 573.
79. Cf. Watts, supra note 51, at 580.
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tinuing policyholders must gamble on future values; and should the assum-
ing company receive them, future increase in value would inure to neither
assenters nor dissenters.
Obviously, then, the evils which flow from being forced to take a new
policy with a lien attached and a moratorium on cash surrender value are
intensified if a number of policyholders dissent, thus requiring partial liquida-
tion. Consequently, if liquidation is held to a minimum, policyholders as a
group stand to gain because the lien will be smaller through the potentially
greater amount of assets transferred.
In view of the importance of encouraging the largest possible number
of acceptances, it is not surprising that the insurance commissioner exercises
his power to further the transfer. Among the means at his disposal to con-
vince possible dissenters that discontinuance is not worthwhile is the use of
the appraisal or fair upset price methods of valuation to produce a value
of the assets so low that dissenters would receive a sum in cash too small
to make it worth their while to dissent.8 0 The loopholes in the law of nova-
tion are taken advantage of by labeling the insured's quiescence as acquies-
cence in the novation,8s at the same time providing the insured with so little
information that he is unaware of any change in his policy. If all these
indirect means of persuasion are insufficient, the commissioner often agrees
to employ personal pressure on the policyholders.82 It might be possible to
go even further and provide the commissioner with statutory power to compel
all policyholders to be transferred, thus avoiding almost any liquidation.83
Constitutional objections might of course be raised as to the abrogation of the
contractual right that obligations shall not be altered without the policy-
holder's consent.8 4 But the public benefit flowing from an avoidance of
liquidation 5 would probably offer a basis sufficient for sustaining such a
80. See Fix=LETre, LAW OF BA.iCRUPTCY REORGANIZATI1ON (1939) 585. See Stevens
v. Central Life Assur. Soc., 101 F. (2d) 383 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939).
81. See text accompanying notes 11-22 supra. The policyholder's failure to file in
the receivership is labeled acceptance of the reinsurer. See, e.g., Peoria reinsurance agree-
ment, supra note 64, § 48. But cf. Hobbs v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 87 F. (2d) 3S0 (C.
C. A. 10th, 1937) (insured may dissent by mailing rejection notice). And even filing
where the policyholder did not know of the rule did not prevent a later election to be
transferred. Hahn v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 132 Neb. 509, 272 N. W. 321 (1937).
Cf. Northwestern Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Gray, 161 Fed. 488 (C. C. A. 8th, 1903).
82. See, e.g., Lucas v. Pittsburgh Life & Trust Co., 137 Va. 255, 119 S. E. 109
(1923). The efficacy of these various methods is illustrated by the generally small num-
ber of dissents. See note 35 supra.
83. See PATrrFsoN, INsURAxcE C01xMISSIONER IN THE UNITm STATS (19-7) 215.
84. The impairment of contracts clause of the federal constitution would be the
chief barrier. Nor could this barrier be overcome by analogy to the constitutionality of
federal bankruptcy statutes, for the clause applies only to the states. GLE:.:., LIQUI.-
TioN (1936) §438.
85. A major benefit to policyholders would result from the ending of the need to
misinform policyholders in order to secure their assent. The public also benefits, for
as the mortgages of small life companies are generally in one area, entire communities
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grant of power, provided that normal requirements of notice and hearing
were guaranteed.8 6
If the commissioner were thus given complete power to compel acceptance,
some of the peripheral difficulties of reinsurance agreements would be elim-
inated. There is, for example, the peculiar judicial treatment accorded
uninsurable risks who insist on sharing in liquidation rather than accepting
a new contract. Inasmuch as the usual rule in liquidation-measuring the
claim by the amount of the reservesT-seems to work a hardship on unin-
surable risks because of their inability to obtain new insurance, some courts
have granted them a refund of all premiums,88 and even the face value of
the policy.80 But either measure of the claim is a preference to the unin-
surable at the expense of the insurable. Furthermore, to return all premiums
is to fail to take into account the protection accorded during the period for
which the premiums were paid; and to make payment of the face value a
fair measure, it would be necessary to subtract the additional premiums the
insured would pay before his death plus the income on his reserve during
the same period were the company to continue in existence. 9
In connection with an additional grant of power to the commissioner to
compel acceptance, it would be necessary to reconsider the frequent practice
of omitting paid-up policyholders from a reinsurance agreement.0 1 It is true
undergo deflation when forced liquidation results. The suggested plan would avoid this
liquidation.
86. The power of the equity courts to compel dissenters to accept securities, exempli-
fied in Phipps v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 284 Fed. 945 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922); the up-
holding of statutes similarly reorganizing state banks [Legis. (1934) 34 COL. L. Rv.
152], and the decisions in Neblett v. Carpenter, 305 U. S. 297 (1938) and People cx rel.
Van Schaik v. National Surety Co., 264 N. Y. 69, 190 N. E. 153 (1934) upholding the
rehabilitation statutes on the ground that insurance is affected with the public interest,
can be relied on to prove the plan's constitutionality. See, on the general subject, Matter
of People (Title & Mtge. Guar. Co. of Buffalo), 264 N. Y. 69, 190 N. E. 153 (1934)
(case upon which the memorandum opinion in the National Surely case wqs based);
Comment (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1443; Note (1934) 34 COL. L. Rav. 663, 701; Watts,
Insurance Company "Rehabilitation" (1939) 33 ILL. L. REV. 798, 802.
87. Kentucky Home Life Ins. Co. v. Miller, 262 Ky. 330, 90 S. W. (2d) 59 (1936).
88. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Baber, 168 Tenn. 347,79 S. W. (2d) 36, 107 A. L. R.
1228 (1935).
89. Abraham Lincoln Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 102 Ind. App. 412, 2 N. E. (2d)
223 (1936).
90. There may, however, be ample reason for the preference. The basis of the
damages measure is the desire to put the policyholder in statu quo. This is accomplished
by giving him damages sufficient to allow taking out of the same amount of insurance
in another company at no increased cost to the policyholder. Illinois Bankers' Life Assur.
Co. v. Payne, 62 S. W. (2d) 315 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933). Where the policyholder is no
longer insurable, logically he should receive face value less premiums he would nor-
mally pay. Because this scheme is difficult of calculation, some courts have seized on
the one set figure which is more than the reserve-the premiums paid in.
91. See, e.g., Rheinberger v. Security Life Ins. Co. of Am., 4 F. Supp. 824 (N. D.
Ill. 1933) ; it re City of Glasgow Life Assur. Co., [1916] 2 Ch. D. 557. But ef. Alliance
Life Ins. Co. v. Saliba, 87 F. (2d) 937 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937).
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that paid-up policyholders contribute nothing further to the reinsurer, and
in that sense their inclusion in the transfer might be at the expense of other
policyholders. 92 But the situation was identical before the transfer-income
from paid-up policyholders was always obtained from the profit on the invest-
ment of their reserves, not from premium payments. The loss of income
from impaired reserves can be offset by establishing a lien against the policy."
Otherwise, their exclusion would have a bad effect on all policyholders because
partial liquidation would then be necessary.
With the policyholder's privilege to dissent from a reinsurance agreement
curtailed either by practical methods such as implying consent or by statutory
power to compel transfer, it is important to provide for fair terms under the
agreement. To make such provision is within the power of the commis-
sioner today.9 4 In receivership cases, the commissioner cooperates with the
court in supervising the contract's formulation.a Although the court jealously
guards the power it possesses by virtue of the insolvent's assets always being
in custodia legis,9 6 it generally bows to the commissioner's superior knowl-
edge.97 And, beyond this nominal supervision9' of contracts prepared under
its own jurisdiction, the court is loathe to void an assumption,"9 reasoning
92. Rheinberger v. Security Life Ins. Co. of Am., 4 F. Supp. 824 (N. D. Ill. 1933).
This is so because some profits made from the other policyholders' premium payments
might have to be used to pay paid-up loss claimants. Thus there will be less profits avail-
able to reduce the lien on the non-paid-up policies.
93. Two alternatives are possible: the lien may be made permanent, subject to re-
duction only by interest from investment of the paid-up policy reserve; or the profits
from all policy holders may be used to cut down the lien in the same proportion as that
of the non-paid-up policies is reduced. The former does away with the preference argu-
ment (except as to the period during which death claimants are paid in full) but is un-
desirable because (1) often the reserve is so impaired that the policy would be worthless
if no change in the lien were permitted, see Green v. American Life & Acc. Ins. Co.,
112 S. NV. (2d) 924 (11o. 1938) (100% lien); and (2) there are administrative diffi-
culties in separating the profits from different segments of the business. The second
alternative is therefore preferred.
94. See p. 123 supra. See also Daniel v. Layton, 75 F. (2d) 135 (C. C. A. 7th,
1935), cert. denied, 295 U. S. 753 (1935), where commissioner's plan apparently pre-
ferred policyholders at the expense of the general creditors, but was nevertheless upheld.
95. See Spratling v. International Life Ins. Co., 23 Ga. App. 609, 99 S. . 162
(1919).
96. As equitable title to the assets remains in the receiver, legal title only passing
to the reinsurer, the court can compel an accounting. Mforthland v. Lincoln Nat. Life
Ins. Co., 25 N. E. (2d) 325 (Ind. 1940); cf. Kentucky Hore Life Ins. Co. v. John-
son, 263 Ky. 787, 93 S. IV. (2d) 863 (1936).
97. People ex tel. Palmer v. Peoria Life Ins. Co., 357 Ill. 4,6, 192 N. F_. 420
(1934). But see Taggart v. Keim, 103 F. (2d) 194 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939). See note 105
infra.
98. See Hartmann v. 'Masters, 269 Fed. 483 (1920), cert. denicd, 255 U. S. 571
(1921) ; People ex rel. Lowe v. Old Colony Life Ins. Co., 270 Ill. App. 403 (1933).
99. See Daniel v. Layton, 75 F. (2d) 135 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935); cf. Walling v. Iowa
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 292 N. W. 157 (Iowa, 1940). But courts do not seem averse to
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either that reinsurance is an internal affair, 10 0 or that the commissioner's
approval removes all doubt of the validity of the agreement. 10 1 By means
of his power, the commissioner can see that the reinsurer is sound, that the
lien is not too large, that the cash surrender moratorium does not cover
too great a period, and that other like protections to policyholders are included.
It is worthy of note that the importance of using the commissioner to
handle reinsurances in insolvency has been recently recognized by the legis-
latures of three important states. New York,102 California10 " and Illinois10 4
have enacted rehabilitation statutes by which the commissioner has been given
power to take over a defunct or near-defunct insurer and form a new and
sound company which will reinsure the old to whatever degree he determines.
While the law does not go to the extent of compelling acceptance of the new
company, the policyholder who refuses to go along may not receive the same
share of the assets of the old company as do the assenting policyholders. 10
Thus an additional persuasive factor is made available to the commissioner.
Rehabilitation may not, of course, always be as satisfactory as a reinsurance
agreement with a new company, particularly if the commissioner were given
power to compel a transfer. An established reinsurer is more likely to have
stability than a rehabilitated company. Moreover, the publicity generally
accorded rehab:ltation may frighten away new business.100  A rehabilitated
insurer may, on the other hand, be able to grant policyholders better terms
than a reinsurer would be willing to offer. In any event the commissioner
will be able, in individual cases, to weigh the relative merits of the form
of relief to be employed.
The conclusion is inescapable that the power granted to the commissioner
to supervise reinsurance agreements is extremely broad. And if he were
declaring a reinsurance agreement ultra vires, if at the behest of the reinsurer. See
Sachs v. Roseland State Savings Bank, 32 F. Supp. 152 (N. D. Ill. 1940); Held v.
Bankers Ins. Corp., 205 Ill. App. 585 (1917); Bankers' Union v. Crawford, 67 Kan.
449, 73 P. 79 (1903) ; Whaley v. Bankers' Union, 39 Tex. Civ. App. 385, 88 S.. W. 259
(1905) ; cf. Wojtczak v. American United Life Ins. Co., 292 N. W. 364 (Mich. 1940)
(ultra vires claim by policyholder of reinsurer denied).
100. Hentschel v. Fidelity & Dep. Co. of Md., 87 F. (2d) 833 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937).
101. Cook v. Ill. Bankers Life Ass'n, 46 F. (2d) 782 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931), cert.
denied, 284 U. S. 627 (1931).
102. N. Y. INs. LAW § 512.
103. CAL. INS. CODE (Deering, 1937) § 1043.
104. ILL. ANN. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1934) c. 73, § 804.
105. The sLope of the commissioner's power over rehabilitation is illustrated by the
plans attacked in In re National Surety, 239 App. Div. 490, 268 N. Y. Supp. 88 (3d
Dep't, 1933): Ca.penter v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. (2d) 307, 74 P. (2d) 761
(1937) ; Garris v. Carpenter, 33 Cal. App. (2d) 649, 92 P. (2d) 688 (1939). See Larson
v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 373 Ill. 614, 27 N. E. (2d) 458 (1940). The enormous power
of the commissioner in contrast to the self-abnegation of t!ie courts as illustrated by the
Pacific Mutual case, supra, and by People v. Peoria Life Ins Co., 357 111. 406, 192 N. E.
420 (1934) is criticized severely in Watts, supra note 86, at 806.
106. Legis. (1933) 33 COL. L. Rzv. 722, 723.
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given statutory authority to compel acceptance of a proposed transfer, par-
ticularly in insolvency cases, it would be almost unlimited. To a consider-
able degree, this would harmonize with the prevailing philosophy in other
forms of reorganization that it is essential to have judicial or administrative
supervision over the formulation, submission for approval, and fairness of a
plan together with the power to bind a dissenting minority to the plan.
But at the same time, the commissioner's power would go further in that
it would deprive policyholders, as creditors, of their right to participate in
the approval of the plan of reorganization. The reason for this is not hard
to find. The large number of policyholders, the need for speed in effecting
the transfer, the ignorance of the insured about the financial intricacies of
insurance-all militate against making policyholder participation a useful
adjunct of insurance reorganization. Reliance must be placed in the only
effective protective device-the independent insurance commissioner's super-
visory power, subject to judicial review, over the fairness of the reinsurance
agreement.
